Teaching scenario planning : lessons from practice in academe and business. by Wright,  G. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
10 May 2010
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Wright, G. and Cairns, G. and Goodwin, P. (2009) ’Teaching scenario planning : lessons from practice in
academe and business.’, European journal of operational research., 194 (1). pp. 323-335.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.12.003
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
 
 
Teaching scenario planning: lessons from practice in academe and business. 
 
George Wright, University of Durham 
George Cairns, University of Essex 
Paul Goodwin, University of Bath 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we engage with O‟Brien‟s (2004) identification of both pitfalls in 
teaching scenario planning and proposed remedies for these. We consider these 
remedies in relation to our own experience - based on our practice in both the 
academic and business arenas -  and we highlight further pitfalls and proposed 
remedies.  Finally, we propose the use of “hard” multi-attribute decision analysis as a 
complement to “soft” scenario planning, in order to allow a more formal method of 
strategy evaluation against a range of constructed scenarios, This approach is 
intended to remedy biases that are associated with holistic evaluations – such as 
lexicographic ranking - where undue attention is paid to particular strategic 
objectives at the expense of others. From this discussion, we seek to contribute to 
cumulative refinement of the scenario process. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
O‟Brien (2004) categorised scenario planning as part of “soft” operational 
research, in that it satisfies the characteristics of soft OR described by Rosenhead 
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and Mingers (2001), and Bennett and Huxham (1982). Specifically, scenario 
planning (i) aids understanding of a situation, (ii) enhances creativity, (iii) is process-
focussed, (iv) requires input from multiple actors, (v) is focussed on perceptions and 
opinions, and (vi) contains an analytical component that is qualitative. The focus of 
O‟Brien‟s paper was an analysis of the process and the product of scenario planning 
teaching at Warwick Business School: “by scanning the product and identifying 
deficiencies (the paper) aims to improve the process itself” (O‟Brien, 2004: 711). 
O‟Brien relates a change in style of delivery – from lectures to facilitated scenario 
construction – and the addition of extra steps in the scenario construction process to 
enable more effective scenario development, by her student audience. The changes 
that she relates reveal the pioneering nature of scenario teaching at Warwick. From 
analysis of the process and products of 15 years of teaching/facilitating the course 
and the experiences of over 1,000 participants, she identified five “common” pitfalls 
emanating from the “early version of the methodology” which was taught to MBA 
students as a process to produce scenarios.  
 
The pitfalls identified by O‟Brien were:  
1) Predictability of a limited set of factor choices.  Here, use of a PEST 
method by participants tended to regularly emphasise economic factors -
such as exchange rates, interest rates, and UK economic activity - as 
uncertainties that were subsequently given prominence in the scenarios 
that participants constructed 
2) Predictability of theme selection.  Here, many participants developed 
either optimistic or pessimistic scenarios 
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3) Focus on current /next/ big issues.  Here, recent and current concerns 
(e.g. of terrorism activities) that had emphasis in the media tended to 
replicate themselves in the scenarios that participants provided.  O‟Brien 
labelled this as “future myopia” 
4) Typical implicit assumptions.  Here, life experiences shared by 
participants (e.g. of peacetime rather than war) were also replicated by 
participants in their construction of scenarios 
5) Unimaginative presentation of scenarios.  Here, the completed scenario 
output tended to be presented with little attention to making an impact on 
the target audience 
 
 
O‟Brien concluded that the above five pitfalls resulted in “predictable, somewhat 
narrow and unchallenging scenarios, unlikely to engage their intended audience” 
(2004: 715).  In the final section of her paper, O‟Brien addressed three process 
adaptations as means of overcoming these pitfalls, namely: 
1. “Participants:  who is using scenario planning?”  Here, O‟Brien argued 
that participants‟ personal world-views and life experiences cannot, in fact, be 
controlled or influenced and can only be acknowledged as a pre-set anchor in 
scenario development. 
2. “Content: what is the scenario process?”  Here, O‟Brien argues that 
lecturers‟ exhortations to participants to be “more creative” in their scenario 
development worked reasonably well in that “unchallenging themes appeared less 
frequently” (2004:  715).  However, adding a step where (i) individual participants 
brainstormed uncertain and predetermined factors and then a step where (ii) groups 
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of participants clustered (and thereby reduced) this output, produced, she argued, a 
more diverse and rich set of factors that could shape the future.  O‟Brien also 
encouraged participants to “..think beyond the traditional PEST categories and thus 
to consider additional categories such as „competition‟ and „regulation‟ “(2004: 716). 
The second revision to the earlier version of Warwick‟s scenario construction 
method was to encourage participants to consider alternative, higher impact ways to 
communicate scenario content – beyond tabular summaries.  Finally, O‟Brien added 
a step in the Warwick scenario construction process, where strategic options for an 
organization were tested for robustness across the set of constructed scenarios. 
3. “Process:  how is the scenario process conveyed to participants?”  
Here the focus was, again, on encouraging creativity within the scenario 
development process and the following possibilities were offered: 
I)    using the internet as a resource for reports on issues relevant to future studies 
ii)   use of a facilitating mode of delivery rather than a traditional lecture mode 
iii) emphasis that, at an early stage of the scenario teaching, the lecturers‟ 
expectation was that the scenario process would produce creative output  
iv)  challenging deep-set assumptions in the participants that the future will be like 
the past. An example O‟Brien gave is that of identifying individuals in the audience 
who know people who cannot read or write.  Such an identification process can 
“challenge pre-conceived ideas about how advanced society has become” (2004: 
717) 
v) emphasising the development and use of scenario outcome presentations that 
promote audience impact – such as TV/radio news broadcasts, newspaper 
headlines etc.  Also advocated was consideration of alternative ways of presenting 
narratives, written in the past, present or future tenses 
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In seeking to offer further incremental development and refinement of scenario 
method, we know turn to our own experience of both teaching on MBA programmes 
in two UK business schools, and working with top management teams on a range of 
scenario projects in the business arena. . 
 Drawing upon illustrative examples from this experience, we reappraise each 
of O‟Brien‟s pitfalls in turn, presenting our recommendations and then comparing and 
contrasting these with O‟Brien‟s responses to these pitfalls, outlined earlier.  In 
addition, we point to additional concerns that we have identified, both in O‟Brien‟s 
approach to scenario planning and from our own experience working with students 
and organizations.  We discuss the implications of these additional pitfalls and 
propose our own solutions to overcoming them. 
 
2. Revisiting O‟Brien‟s „pitfalls‟ in scenario development 
 
Pitfall 1:  Predictability of a limited set of factor choices   
 
Our own method of facilitating the development of a wider range of scenario 
dimensions aims to overcome the “silo” laundry-listing that can emerge from a simple 
elicitation of participants‟ ideas using the categories within PEST (Political, 
Economic, Societal, and Technological) or its derivatives (STEEP and PESTEL, 
PESTLED etc) that prompt elicitation of further issues of current concern - such as 
Law, Ecology and Demographics.  Burt et al (in press) have noted that there is a 
growing recognition in the research literature that the nature of the business 
environment is best conceptualised as organization-specific (Montgomery et al 1989) 
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– thus recognising the limited applicability of generic, taxonomic approaches such as 
PEST. Indeed, the business environment can be conceptualised as the outcome of 
organizational processes, and thus as being socially constructed (Berger and 
Luckman 1966; Eden 1992; Weick 1979, 1995; Mir and Watson 2000). 
Although, as with O‟Brien‟s approach, the initial stage of our scenario method 
involves identification and recording of areas of interest or concern to the participants 
about their organization‟s contextual environment, using the PEST (or its 
adaptations, such as PESTEL) categories as a generator of ideas, we find that new 
insights are seldom generated - since what has been listed is frequently presented in 
fairly general terms, and is already well known to participants. The taxonomic 
classifications of PEST and its derivatives are, we contend, of limited help to an 
organization in exploring and understanding its environment because they are too 
generic, fail to deliver understanding of the inter-relationships and inter-dependences 
among variables, and do not produce a detailed understanding of the dynamics of 
change. At this stage, we would highlight our view that, first, the limitations of PEST 
analysis can be addressed through expansion of the set of involved actors in the 
process, as in the introduction of „remarkable people‟, in order to broaden the field of 
thinking on the problem in question. Second, we would point out that even a 
constraining PEST analysis may hold advantages, in that it may force individuals 
within the group to move beyond their own „bounded rationality‟ (March and Simon, 
1958) within a particular sphere of, say, the „technological‟ or „economic‟.  
Whilst some scenario projects develop scenarios that deal with global or 
regional issues at a very general level – so-called global scenarios - we find that 
contextualizing scenario construction within a client organization, or in the minds of 
students, requires that the “business issue” to be addressed should be clearly 
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defined – so-called decision-focused scenarios. The pitfall of developing non-
contextualized, global scenarios, to our minds, is that these can only take account of 
the PEST factors at a superficial level, whereas scenarios which are built around an 
issue of concern – often the continuing viability of an organisation‟s current success 
formula or “business idea” (van der Heijden, 1996) – require judgements about the 
relevance of environmental factors to be made in relation to that issue of concern. 
We detail the specifics of our decision-focussed scenario construction methodology 
in the next section of this paper: ”Pitfall 2: predictability of theme selection”. 
Seeking to expand the boundaries of group thinking within an organization-
focused scenario project, there is a need to move beyond simple listings and 
descriptions of the environment and to help management teams understand their 
environment – or rather, the „multiple realities‟ (Beech and Cairns, 2001) of their 
different world views that are socially-constructed through narratives, dialogue and 
conversation (Smircich and Stubbart 1985). It is in relation to the facilitation of 
understanding and interchange between these different world views, in order to open 
up a „strategic conversation‟ (van der Heijden, 1996) about the complexity and 
ambiguity of and exposition of multiple perspectives on organizational problems in 
the present, that we see the key value of scenario method, rather than in any notion 
of them presenting different „realities‟ of what the future might be. 
In developing a broader understanding of the world at large, one further pitfall 
which we identified - whether working with students on a problem with which they are 
largely unfamiliar, or with an organization in which there is a good depth of 
understanding of the issue, but from an internal perspective - is a tendency for 
information drawn from external sources through a PEST analysis to be treated as 
“knowledge”, in that the veracity of the source is not questioned, or that a single 
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source is accepted without validation through triangulation.  We term this pitfall, the 
assumed veracity of obtained knowledge. That is to say, that information taken, for 
example, from Internet sources will often remain unchallenged, by scenario team 
members, in terms of the veracity of the source of the knowledge. Often there is little 
evaluation of potential vested interests involved, i.e., little or no consideration of how 
“knowledge” is socially constructed according to the knowledge-originator‟s beliefs, 
values and rationalities. 
Our experience of working with students indicates that this pitfall is more likely 
to be overcome when building scenarios surrounding an issue which, for most, lies 
beyond their range of experience and their expectation of the class. For example, 
when we introduced a project on exploring scenarios for sustainable healthcare and 
education in Sub-Saharan Africa to MBA students, the initial reaction of many – 
particularly the most able – was to challenge us on what this had to do with business 
education. However, because the scenario project dealt with largely unknown 
territory, the exercise (i) challenged students‟ intellects and the socio-economic 
rationale of their day-to-day thinking, (ii) introduced a moral/ethical dimension to their 
thinking, and (iii) generated not only a large amount of research, but also critical 
discussion and consideration of the political and other agendas of sources of 
information, and analysis of the causal linkages between different factors and the 
agency of the various involved actors.  
In short, we believe that emphasis on analyzing and understanding the 
environment should shift from mere data-gathering (even from the broadest range of 
sources) to detailed consideration of how members of the organization (or in a 
teaching context, members of the participant team) perceive relationships among 
uncertainties and pre-determined outcomes. Cognitive activity acts to make these 
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relationships meaningful to involved actors and to help them understand the agency 
of others. Aiding participants‟ recognition and understanding of the inter-relatedness 
and dynamic interaction of such variables and the multiple possibilities for their 
resolution is, we believe, the key to effective environmental analysis. As an 
uncertainty in one of the variables within a PEST dimension resolves itself, one way 
or the other, as an outcome, that outcome will often be perceived to impact other 
variables (within and between PEST dimensions) and so have a domino-like 
propagation – as a particular scenario unfolds. The level of sophistication of the 
students‟ analysis is, at this stage, dependent upon the breadth of the investigation, 
in terms of the number of factors identified, and the depth of understanding, in 
relation to the specificity of the information which informs participants‟ 
understandings of a particular issue.  
In order to broaden the scope of analysis in both our teaching and in our 
consultancy approach, the factors generated from the PEST brainstorming exercise 
are, in our scenario methodology, next collated by participants into clusters of inter-
related factors that span the dimensions of PEST.  Clustering is the activity of 
grouping causally related uncertainties with pre-determined elements and capturing, 
graphically, a group‟s (emergent) understanding of the linkages and relationships 
among them.  The process is designed not only to help participants to understand 
linkages of causality and chronology, but also to reduce a wide range of issues and 
ideas into a smaller number of higher-level concepts - the names of the cluster 
contents, once clarified.  In Figures 1 and 2, we provide an example to illustrate and 
amplify the process of grouping and labelling inter-related factors. In Figure 1, we 
illustrate a STEEP-evoked listing of some of the factors identified by students at 
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considering scenarios for sustainable health and education in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(here, based upon 81 factors identified by one group of 6 students). 
 ------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
  ----------------------------------- 
 
Next, we asked participants to look behind the occurrence of specific events 
(i.e., resolved outcomes of uncertainties or pre-determined elements) and look for 
patterns and structures that underpin their occurrence. We directed participants to 
create linkages which would explain the behaviour of variables – and to express 
these linkages in the form of influence diagrams that represented and clarified such 
relationships.  At this point, we should address two possible critical responses to the 
process thus far; one philosophical and one content-related. The philosophical 
question is that of how the notion of social construction that is inherent in the 
scenario process is reconciled with social construction‟s denial of causality, as 
perceived in positivistic terms, in that investigation of causality is advocated.  The 
answer to the first question is related to that of the second. The investigations of 
„causality‟ which are induced in the scenario process advocated here are based 
upon acceptance that they are mere social constructions. As such, as these causal 
linkages are discussed within the group process and subjected to multiple 
interpretations and reinterpretations, new factors are likely to be surfaced and can be 
incorporated into the process. This incorporation of new elements can happen at any 
time. In complex scenario projects, with multiple iterations of the process, there will 
be a cumulative aggregation of factors considered. But, even in simple, single-
iteration scenario constructions, the structure of the process should not be seen as 
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sacrosanct, excluding adaptation and incorporation of new ideas at any stage in 
order to increase the depth of understanding of the issue under consideration. 
 Figure 2 documents some of the “cross-disciplinary” links that were formed 
from the content of a STEEP-evoked listing based upon the exercise illustrated in 
Figure 1. We present two clusters of cross-disciplinary, linked factors indicating how 
participants perceive the various factors to interact and influence one another at the 
particular stage in the project. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
We now turn to highlight two key differences between our scenario construction 
methodology and that of O‟Brien (2004). First, in the initial identification of factors, 
we do not seek pre-judgement of whether they are predetermined or uncertain, for 
instance, by requiring specification of “a minimum of 40 uncertain factors plus a 
smaller number of predetermined elements” (2004: 716). Rather, we enable 
participants to consider the question of certainty/uncertainty as one of emergent 
relativity between issues, not as categorical dichotomous choice at the outset. 
Second, the process of reduction to a smaller number of clusters is not one of 
exclusion or of prioritization, since the content of each cluster is retained, and all 
individual factor outcomes are considered and placed within one of the four scenario 
storylines at the end, in order to add richness and diversity to the content. In 
addition, as highlighted above, additional factors may be introduced at any time 
during the process, such that process does not take precedence of purpose. We 
return to the practicalities of this stage of our scenario construction methodology in 
the next section of this paper: “Pitfall 2: predictability of theme selection”. 
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By bringing the STEEP variables together in such an exercise, our scenario 
method enables participants to look behind the obvious, taxonomic nature of STEEP, 
in order to develop a deeper, inter-connected understanding of the interplay among 
variables, as well as the causal logic of relationships amongst these variables.  In the 
exercise illustrated in Figure 2, the clusters were generated through a process of 
participants engaging in a “strategic conversation” (van der Heijden, 1996), in which 
all of the 81 factors identified were placed on a wall, then manoeuvred into initial 
clusters, moved again, regrouped numerous times over a period of about one hour, 
and finally grouped into a set of 8 clusters. The only rule of this stage was that the 
components of each cluster must be connected by arrows showing cause/effect  
impact or chronological relatedness - such that each element within a cluster is 
connected to every other, either directly or indirectly. This form of 
causal/chronological relationship analysis elicits detailed conversation and 
consideration of the inter-relatedness of different factors across the STEEP 
categories, and leads to their breakdown and re-conceptualization in new ways, 
albeit that the relationships must always be seen to be socially constructed, rather 
than indicative of some objective „truth‟. 
The next step in our methodology involves naming the clusters, encapsulating 
every constituent element under an overarching title which identifies a higher-level 
issue of impact upon the issue of concern. In this case example, the issue of concern 
was the future viability of a particular, named, organisation involved in the provision 
of health education in Sub-Saharan Africa. The titles that participants gave to the two 
illustrative clusters are also shown in Figure 2. 
 
Pitfall 2: Predictability of theme selection 
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In the second stage of our scenario process, we ask participants to write their 
cluster headings on new post-its and place these post-its on an impact/predictability 
chart. Our instructions are as follows: 
 
• Post cluster headings on the Impact/Predictability chart (using post-its). Rank, 
first, in terms of impact on the issue of concern (horizontally), then on predictability 
(vertically) (Note: here, we clarify that we refer to predictability of the outcome of the 
issue/event, not of its happening). 
• Which of these cluster headings would really make a difference for the case 
organization when the events, therein, resolve themselves one way or the other? 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the placing of cluster headings on the impact/predictability 
chart, and identifies the “scenario structuring space” – where cluster headings 
containing the potential scenario dimension are physically located.  Note that our 
two, illustrative, cluster headings are included on the impact/predictability matrix. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Our next instructions to participants are: 
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• Consider the “more impact/less predictable” corner and try to identify the 2 
most important cluster headings (bottom right quadrant). Each cluster heading is, 
potentially, the name of a scenario dimension 
• Identify two plausible outcomes for each of the two scenario dimensions. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates two plausible outcomes for each of two potential scenario 
dimensions - based upon the student project on scenarios for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
outlined above.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Our next step is to ask our participants if the outcome combinations A1B1, 
A2B2, A2B1, and A2B2 are viable pairings of the plausible outcomes that were 
previously identified. If one or, at most, two of the four pairings are not seen by 
participants as viable, then this is indicative that the two potential scenario 
dimensions are not independent of one another and can be collapsed into a single 
dimension. In such a case, participants are advised to choose another potential 
dimension from amongst those other cluster headings in the lower right-hand 
quadrant of the scenario structuring space. In this way, two independent dimensions 
are elicited from participants. Since these dimensions are a result of the “cross-
disciplinary” clustering in Stage 1 of our scenario construction process, the potential 
pitfall of “predictability of theme selection” is attenuated – the obvious, PEST-derived 
dimensions are avoided. Also, as a consequence of our process, the construction of 
optimistic and pessimistic futures is avoided – since the plausible outcomes will, 
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necessarily, contain a mix of positive and negative factors that interact in the causal 
chains, both within and between clusters. 
 
Pitfall 3: Focus on current / next big/ issues 
 
O‟ Brien identified the dominance of recent and current concerns of participants 
in their scenario development and called it “future myopia”. In behavioural decision 
research, “future myopia” can be viewed as an “availability bias” and/or “anchoring-
and-insufficient-adjustment bias” (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, for a review). A 
more general conceptualisation of “future myopia” is that of a “framing bias” – a term 
which refers to an inappropriate conceptualisation of a decision context. In our view, 
this potential pitfall in scenario development will not necessarily be overcome 
through the participation of in-organization “experts” in scenario construction 
process. Even with in-depth analysis through processes of structured interviews with 
key actors, and research carried out over time both inside the organization and in 
relation to external factors, we consider it necessary to challenge the framing of 
organisational participants - and their (what may be) partial view on the nature of the 
future - by introducing the input of “remarkable people” (van der Heijden et al., 2002; 
Schwartz, 1991) drawn from relevant external sources. This challenge to thinking is 
most easily achieved in practice rather than in student learning. The reason for this is 
that the inclusion of “remarkable people” into a scenario process, in order to 
attenuate framing bias, is likely to be a costly exercise. By remarkable people, we do 
not necessarily refer to those who are „more expert‟ than the involved actors, since 
we acknowledge that organizational participants will indeed be the experts in relation 
to their own context. In addition, as Cairns et al (2004) argued, the term “remarkable 
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person” is not necessarily best applied to those who are expert in the field of 
investigation.  Experts can be so narrowly focused on current best practice that they 
are embedded in business-as-usual thinking.  Rather, we refer to those with 
knowledge that can challenge and extend the inherent knowledge of participants – 
and perhaps change participants‟ perceptions of, what are seen to be, high-impact 
uncertainties into perceptions of pre-determined, lower-impact, elements. 
Alternatively, their insights might turn perceptions of, what were previously seen as, 
predetermined elements into uncertainties.  
The role of the remarkable person in the conversation is to challenge the 
thinking of the scenario team and their preconceptions of a situation. In other words, 
the process encourages individuals to critically engage with their own cultural 
programming.   In seeking appropriately creative and challenging thinkers, it is 
possible to look both to those at the leading edge of knowledge development in the 
specific problem context, and among those leading the field in a different context.  It 
is also possible to find remarkable people in related fields that are, perhaps, at a 
higher level of development.  For instance, if we were seeking a remarkable person‟s 
input into conversations on potential futures in low-cost air travel in Europe, we 
would consider including individuals who have knowledge concerned with futures in 
high-speed rail travel, governance in the European Union, the changing political 
environment, and the effects of international terrorism. 
Obviously, the choice of remarkable people is dependent, to a large extent, on 
budget and availability, but one lesson from practice is the importance providing a 
challenge to the mindsets of scenario participants in the scenario team. The most 
effective „remarkable person‟ is not the one who merely adds detail to what 
participants already know, but who causes them to challenge the very foundations of 
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their knowledge and to test its robustness in the context of different social 
constructions. Even in the academic arena, we have found students to be extremely 
resourceful in finding access to remarkable people, drawing upon their networks of 
family, friends, business colleagues, and even through “cold calling” upon suitable 
candidates  at long-range using Internet resources. In short, any activity to generate 
and challenge pre-existent framing is, we believe, a valuable exercise. 
The short case description that follows next illustrates the use of remarkable 
people in scenario practice with organizations, here in the field of local government. 
Cairns et al (2004) explored e-government futures within a scenario intervention that 
included representatives from multiple agencies – including local councils, police 
authorities, education authorities, the UK Benefits Agency, and the charity Age 
Concern. In the intervention, we sought to bring into the conversation examples of 
leading-edge, future-oriented thinking from the arenas of information and 
communication technology (ICT), from those tasked with turning ideas from seeming 
science fiction for most of us into practical propositions for business in the next 
decade.  In addition, we involved critical thinkers on the role of governance in 
society, and on the relationships between governments, businesses and 
communities.  Finally, we sought to expose the group to the implementation of e-
government initiatives in other countries, from the USA to Singapore and Australia – 
countries where current technologies were being pushed to their limits or where 
boundaries of public/private were being challenged.  These inputs were not intended 
to show solutions to the problem at hand by copying from these other arenas.  
Rather, they were intended to open up members‟ thinking to a wider range of „limits 
of the possible‟ – what might be plausible and feasible in their own context, both now 
and in the future. 
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As outlined in the previous section, we consider that analysis of the role and 
agency of different actors is an essential part of the scenario process. In our 
approach, this is further supported by the use of “stakeholder analysis” (van der 
Heijden et al. 2002), in which the widest possible range of individuals and 
organizations who can affect or be affected by the issue under consideration are 
identified, and their relative degrees of power over, and interest in, the outcomes of a 
particular scenario as it unfolds are considered. As such, the actions of powerful, 
interested, stakeholders will serve to preserve and enhance their own interests and 
these actions should be added, as a final ingredient, into the scenario storylines. 
Stakeholder analysis is a dynamic process used, first, to help develop the scenarios, 
and, second, as part of the testing of options generated from the scenario process. 
Discussion of the power/interest matrix can be a powerful tool for uncovering biases 
in thinking within groups. For example, in considering scenarios for education and 
healthcare in Sub-Saharan Africa, there was an initial tendency for participants to put 
“children in Africa” at the centre of their thinking, and to consider them as having a 
major impact on the issue. Through consideration of the matrix, it was recognised 
that this approach was based upon emotional, rather than rational criteria. The 
powerlessness of key actors was identified here. In other examples, groups identified 
high power groups who had little or no interest in the current situation, but whose 
interest might be awakened at some point as a particular scenario unfolds – and who 
would then act. Similarly, groups with high interest and little power were identified, 
and consideration given to how they might seek to form political alliances with these 
high-power groups within the storylines of particular scenarios. In short, both the use 
of remarkable people and the use of stakeholder analyses enable the development 
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of scenarios that give a clearer, non-myopic, view of the nature of the future as it 
unfolds in a particular scenario storyline. 
 
Powell and Swart (2005) and Swart and Powell (2006) detail a method that 
presents a traceable, qualitative, scenario generation process which accesses 
participants‟ subjective understanding of the dynamics of the transition process 
between possible future scenarios. Their method builds on prior work by Rhyne (eg 
1974) and represents the participants‟ views of the use of knowledge by human 
actors in fulfilling their specific roles within an interacting system. This 
conceptualisation can extend stakeholder analysis. However, by caution, note that 
Liebl (2002) views complex societal problems as in principle, not  amenable to 
decomposition into cause-effect linkages – the consequences arising from  a set of 
actions can be indeterminate or unpredictable in highly politicised situations when 
there are conflicts between stakeholders. 
 
 
Pitfall 4: Typical implicit assumptions 
 
By broadening out of the field of investigation, introducing the processes of 
clustering and naming, involving remarkable people, and applying stakeholder 
analysis to both scenario storyline development and option analysis, we consider 
that O‟Brien‟s fourth pitfall; typical implicit assumptions; may be addressed, in that 
participants are challenged to surface and share their individual value-rationalities, 
and are introduced to perspectives from outside their immediate context of day-to-
day activities.  In addition, as Schwartz (1991) points out, information may be both 
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enhanced and filtered through engagement with a broad range of published sources 
that can offer valued insights into the issue in question. In teaching, we frequently 
bring to the classroom a selection of that week‟s quality newspapers and journals 
such as The Economist or Time, pointing out that there will be a range of reports of 
relevance to practically any complex organizational problem. 
The role of the facilitator is also key to overcoming the constraints of implicit 
assumptions. In our practice, we adopt the approach of using “round robin” elicitation 
of issues linked to the scenario agenda at the outset, whereby each participant in 
turn is required to raise one issue at a time, until all ideas are exhausted. As ideas 
are presented, only questions of clarification are permitted, and no idea can be 
challenged and excluded at this stage. The establishment of an unthreatening 
environment in which any and every idea can be aired is crucial. Whilst O‟Brien 
(2004: 717) stresses the need for “reminding participants that they should expect to 
produce creative work”, we believe that there is nothing more likely to stifle creativity 
than the negative reaction of peers or, in particular, superiors within the organization. 
By utilising the round-robin approach to idea generation, we attempt, in our scenario 
practice, to provide “airtime” for each of the participants‟ viewpoints on issues related 
to the scenario agenda 
 
Pitfall 5: Unimaginative presentation of scenarios 
 
O‟Brien stresses the importance of attracting audience attention with the final 
scenario presentation, and places emphasis on the selection of media by 
encouraging creative use of ideas such as mock newspaper or television reports. 
O‟Brien notes that some students preferred not to write narratives, whilst others 
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would construct causally-related – but uninspiring – storylines. Whilst we would 
agree that the impact of the scenarios (on an audience outside of those who have 
constructed the scenarios) relies upon first gaining attention, we note that a media-
rich, PowerPoint presentation can, sometimes, hide a lack of in-depth analysis of the 
causal patterns underlying events. In our work on e-government, we found that an 
audience‟s attention was sharply focused when a presented scenario was (i) seen to 
be grounded in common perceptions of the present, and (ii) unfolded, logically, from 
the perceived present into a rich picture of a future via a believable progression. 
From our consultancy practice, we observe that the greatest impact upon 
organizational thinking came from those scenarios in which causally-unfolding 
storylines were both plausible and discomforting – revealing that the future might not 
represent a comfortable continuum from the past and transition from the present. We 
have termed this experience the “organisational jolt” (van der Heijden et al, 2002). 
Our goal, in scenario construction, is to provide enabling conditions to challenge 
current thinking and evoke a strategic conversation within an organisation (or within 
a student team).  Such a challenge to thinking prompts renewed scrutiny of both (i) 
the organisation and its current success formula and (ii) the organisation‟s current 
strategies - the viability of which is to be tested against the organisationally-focussed 
scenarios in the final stage of our scenario methodology. We detail this final stage of 
our scenario methodology in Section 3: “assessing the robustness of strategies”. 
With the best student groups, also, we found that a focus, in scenario 
development, on the plausibility and coherence of the developed storylines, 
illustrated by reference to „real‟ events and their implications, attracted greater 
attention and a more thoughtful response, not only from us as tutors and markers, 
but from their peers as well. In the project to study Sub-Saharan Africa, writing over 
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3 years ago, one student group attracted the attention of their audience by reference 
to how “even the one positive of the Mugabe period, an excellent primary education 
system as a result of one of the highest levels of spending on education in Africa, 
has dwindled due to lack of investment and shortage of teachers”. Looking further 
into the future, the student group posited that investment “from 2008 onwards was 
increasingly looked upon as being concerned only with the „rape‟ of dwindling natural 
resources and the lining of the pockets of a number of authoritarian leaders”. 
 Figure 5 contains extracts from the four scenarios that were developed from 
the two scenario dimensions identified in Figure 4. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Thus, we would concur that the effectiveness of scenario planning is, in part, a 
function of the medium of presentation, but would argue that a sophisticated and 
critical audience will look beyond the surface veneer of the media employed, to seek 
out the evidence of comprehensive, in-depth research and logical analysis, which 
underpins the perceived plausibility of the constructed scenarios. 
 
 
3. Assessing the robustness of strategies 
 
O‟Brien‟s final revision to her original scenario development process involved 
the inclusion of a step which made explicit the impact of the scenarios on the 
organisation (using a TOWS matrix to stimulate debate). In explaining this step she 
also refers to: “one final test – explicitly check each option under each scenario to 
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see if it is robust”. We believe that use of the TOWS matrix – and linking this analysis 
to other methods for generating, evaluating, and selecting strategic options is a 
strong contribution to emerging practice. However, assessing the implications of 
strategies and their robustness is likely to be a difficult task for unaided participants 
in many scenario planning exercises. Many organisations will have a plurality of 
objectives to consider in their planning processes (for example objectives relating to 
financial return, the environment and employee welfare).  This means that if there 
are m strategies that need to be evaluated against n objectives under p scenarios 
then m x n x p evaluations will need to be performed. However, these evaluations 
would not only require i) an assessment of the performance of each strategy under 
each objective and scenario, they would also involve: ii) the need to make trade-offs 
between the objectives and iii) the need to assess the robustness of the multi-
attributed outcomes across the scenarios. The evidence of psychological research is 
that decision makers are severely restricted in their ability to make these types of 
assessments (e.g. Tversky, 1969, Tversky, 1972, Fishburn 1991). Human beings 
have limited information processing capacity (Hogarth, 1987) and, when they are 
faced with such complexity, they resort to simplified mental strategies known as 
heuristics.  The heuristics have been demonstrated to severely constrain decision 
making ability even when the extra dimension created by multiple scenarios is not 
present. For example, when an unaided decision maker who has multiple objectives 
is required to choose a course of action from a restricted set of alternatives, he or 
she is likely simply to consider the performance on the most important objective and 
ignore how well the options perform in relation to the other objectives (the heuristic 
employed here is known as lexicographic ranking (Tversky, 1969)). Even more 
sophisticated heuristics, such as elimination by aspects (Tversky, 1972) fail to 
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address the problem of trade-offs so that the relatively poor performance of a course 
of action on one objective is not compensated, in the decision maker‟s assessment, 
by good performance on other objectives. 
O‟Brien argues that scenario planning can be classed as a „soft‟ OR approach 
because it has characteristics such as a qualitative analytical component and a 
tendency not to rely on hard data.  She argues that such approaches can foster the 
understanding of situations and engender new perspectives of a problem. While we 
agree with these assertions we also see little within scenario planning that can 
support participants in their assessment of the performance and robustness of 
strategies.  
Decision analysis (Goodwin and Wright, 2004), is designed to provide such 
support. Although there is no universal agreement about what constitutes a soft or 
hard OR, and the techniques relating to each approach are best viewed as being on 
a continuum between soft and hard extremes (Brown et al., 2006), decision analysis 
is much close to the hard end of the spectrum than scenario planning. Unlike softer 
approaches, it is designed to produce tangible recommendations for action , it has 
„taken for granted‟ views of what is meant by rationality in option choice and it has a 
prescribed approach to analysis. It also views quantification as being both possible 
and desirable.  
However, decision analysis also has some aspects that are usually associated 
with soft methods (see Brown et al., 2006, table 1). Its data is usually based on 
judgment and opinion, and it aims to foster shared perceptions amongst groups of 
decision makers and to support action and learning. Also, its approach to validity is 
congruent with that of softer methods. In hard OR a model will, as far as possible, be 
validated by comparing its predictions to the real world (for example, a simulation 
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model of a bank‟s customer queuing system will be validated if it predicts the 
behaviour of the real system with reasonable accuracy). In decision analysis, where 
there is unlikely to be an external analogue to allow real world comparison,   
validation is obtained by applying tests such as logical consistency and model 
credibility. This validation can take the form of requisite modelling (Phillips, 1984) 
where: 
“the modeling process uses the sense of unease among the problem owners about the 
results of the current model as a signal that further modeling may be needed, or that 
intuition may be wrong. If exploration of the discrepancy between holistic judgment and 
model results shows the model to be at fault, then the model is not requisite – it is not 
yet sufficient to solve the problem. The model can be considered requisite only when no 
new intuitions emerge about the problem” 
Despite the argument that soft and hard OR are underpinned by fundamentally 
different ontologies (theories and assumption about the world, (Checkland, 1981)) 
we believe that „softer‟ scenario planning and „harder‟ multi attribute decision 
analysis can bring complementary benefits to the strategic planning process. The 
former can provide the stimulus to “future focussed thinking” (Wright and Goodwin, 
1999) and the latter can enable a thorough appraisal of the strategic options. It can 
achieve this by providing a collection of formal, logical, axiom-based procedures for 
appraising options.  Its approach enables complex problems to be decomposed into 
separate parts so that the decision maker‟s judgment can be focussed, in turn, on 
each relatively simple part.  These decomposed judgments are then aggregated, 
consistent with the axioms of decision analysis, so that an overall comparison can be 
made between the options. This approach has been referred to as a „divide and 
conquer‟ orientation of decision analysis (Keeney, 1982).  
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The notion of combining hard and soft OR approaches is not new. For example, 
Mingers and Gill (1997) argue that “using two or more management science 
methodologies [multimethodology] in the same intervention is likely to produce a 
richer picture for "seeing and understanding the complex web of relationships and 
interconnectivities" which is likely to lead to better decision taking by managers and 
workers.” They argue this while still acknowledging the different philosophical 
underpinning of the various methodologies.  More recently, Brown et al., (2006)) 
describe the complementary application of hard and soft methods in a review of the 
British personal taxation system. The authors, who used the soft and hard OR in 
parallel, reported that the interaction between the approaches led to a synergy which 
enhanced the understanding and validation of outcomes. 
How can we exploit the complementary strengths of scenario planning and 
decision   analysis? While the parallel application of hard and soft methods brought 
benefits in Brown et al‟s (2006) study, we believe that in the strategic planning 
context the soft and hard approaches should be used sequentially with the soft 
preceding the hard. There are a number of reasons for this. The focus of 
„conventional‟ decision analysis is on comparing alternative courses of actions that 
are drawn from a restricted set of alternatives, by evaluating outcomes that are 
predicated on these alternatives, Thus the effect of using decision analysis too early 
in the planning process might be to constrain: i) the diversity of possible futures that 
can be envisaged (e.g. see, Fischhoff et al.s’ (1978) „out of sight, out of mind‟ 
phenomenon) and ii) the design of novel courses of action that may be superior to 
those originally considered. Such an approach is likely to reinforce the existing view 
of the world.  Indeed, as a more detailed decision model is developed during the 
analyst/decision maker interaction, misplaced confidence in this worldview may be 
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increased (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). In contrast, as we have seen, the prior 
use of scenario planning should promote alternative views about the nature of the 
future and stimulate the subsequent creation of enhanced decision options.  The 
subsequent use of multi-attribute decision analysis should then enable insightful 
evaluation of strategic options taking into account the full set of identified objectives 
and scenarios (see Goodwin and Wright, 2001, for an example of how this decision 
analytic approach can be used to complement scenario planning). 
 
Of course, there will be limitations to the decision analysis approach in some 
contexts. The process of quantitatively evaluating options across different scenarios 
will be time consuming, especially when the model is revised as managers learn 
more about the decision problem. Some managers may also have an aversion to 
use of numbers to measure the performance of options on objectives which are 
qualitative in nature.  Also, the method is likely to require the input of weights to 
reflect the relative importance of the objectives to the decision and some managers 
may find that assessing the weights is a demanding task. Models are likely to be 
more acceptable when they are transparent and relatively simple, but such simplicity 
can usually be only be obtained by approximating the real problem. For example, the 
simplest models assume than an option‟s performance across the objectives can be 
measured by using a linear additive scoring rule. Such a rule would preclude 
interactions between an option‟s performances on different objectives. Nevertheless, 
we emphasise that we propose decision analysis as a method to support strategic 
decision makers, not to replace them. Its aim is not to produce „optimal‟ decisions but 
to foster understanding, insights and creativity and to challenge intuition. This can be 
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often be achieved by using simple models with known approximations and 
limitations. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have reprised O‟ Brien‟s identification of pitfalls in teaching 
student groups how to develop scenarios and her remedies to overcome these 
pitfalls. The pitfalls that she identified were (i) predictability of factor choices, (ii) 
predictability of theme selections (iii) focus on current/high profile issues, (iv) typical 
implicit assumptions, and (v) unimaginative presentation.  In addressing these 
pitfalls, O‟Brien called for three process adaptations, related to: first, critical 
engagement with the centrality of participants‟ world-views, second, explicit 
exhortation to be „more creative‟ and , third, offer of supporting mechanisms to 
enhance creativity. In considering both O‟Brien‟s pitfalls and remedies, we have 
outlined further issues and proposed solutions based upon our own experience in 
teaching and practice. Specifically, we consider that O‟Brien‟s (2004: 716) attempt to 
move thinking beyond the myopic and the consideration of the immediate by calling 
upon participants to identify “a minimum of 40 uncertain factors plus a smaller 
number of predetermined elements” is constraining upon the very creativity that she 
advocates. In order to elicit the widest possible range of factors, whilst enabling them 
to be considered in relation to one another without selection and exclusion, we offer 
enhancement of the scenario process framework. In our paper, we have 
documented the development of decision-focused, rather than global scenarios, and 
have argued that such a contextualisation will tend to result in the generation of 
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scenarios that do not simply anchor on the basic PEST or STEEP dimensions. 
Additionally, the identification of “cross-disciplinary clusters” and causal linkages 
between cluster elements helps to provide a basis for scenario storyline 
development. A subsequent step in our scenario development methodology was to 
identify high-impact and low–predictability in the cross-disciplinary cluster headings. 
We also advocate the use of “remarkable people” and stakeholder analysis to 
enhance scenario development. Also, round-robin elicitation of ideas from members 
of the scenario team aids the creation of scenario storylines. At the same time, 
“knowledge” gained from internet resources should be viewed and interpreted with 
thoughtfulness and vigilance. Whilst accepting O‟Brien‟s call for greater creativity 
and expansion of the boundaries of thinking in development of scenario stories, we 
consider that creativity in the story presentation is not, in itself, sufficient, but that 
scenario stories must be seen to be both engaging and plausible, and challenging of 
yet set within the boundaries of possibility. The overall focus of our approach to 
scenario building is thus to create plausible, causally–related storylines that can 
provoke an “organisation jolt”.  
Finally, we suggest that it is psychologically difficult to evaluate the 
robustness of strategy against constructed scenarios in an holistic way. We do not 
see scenario method as a means of developing and offering stories of what the 
future will necessarily be. Rather, we see it as a means of better understanding the 
nature of the present and for offering multiple perspectives on complex 
organizational problems. For this reason, we advocate the use of multi-attribute 
value analysis at this, final, stage of scenario development. Such a combination of 
“soft” and “hard” approaches to decision making in the face of uncertainty provides a 
useful alternative to the conventional application of decision analysis.  
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Our aim in this paper has been to build upon the contribution of O‟Brien‟s 
(2004) paper on scenario method and to offer some additional insights into both the 
pitfalls of the approach and ways in which they might be addressed both in teaching 
and practice. 
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Social Cultural misconceptions in treating disease 
Educated classes stay or migrate 
(Non-)acceptance of AIDS/HIV by political leaders 
Cultural differences between African peoples 
Learning and reuse of knowledge in SSA context 
Multi-nationals involvement in supporting education 
Age profile of African populace skewed towards younger people 
Mindset for success or failure 
Tiered pricing of drugs 
Education leads to employment opportunity and growth 
Technological Availability of effective treatment for malaria 
Availability of wireless technologies at reasonable cost 
Falling cost of IT hardware and infrastructure 
Exploitation of new and renewable energy sources 
Commitment of governments to address food shortages 
ICT infrastructure 
Access to preferential price strategies on antiviral drugs 
Economic Reliance on aid from „developed‟ countries 
Reduction in debt burden 
Development of local industries and resources 
Trade barriers 
Population migration 
Monetary policies 
Environmental Compliance with Kyoto agreement 
Changes in global warming 
Water management strategies 
Conflict caused by cross-border energy resources 
Development of bio-mass energy capabilities 
Political Regime legitimacy in Zimbabwe 
Impact of African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
Involvement of religious organisations 
Filling void left by years of colonialism 
Changing access to secondary/tertiary education 
Transparency of governance systems 
GDP percentage spent on defence 
Legal Relaxation or tightening regulation of aid provision 
Tackling corruption through legislation 
Refugee status 
Managed access to intellectual property 
Licensing of software 
Movement to improvement in judicial practices 
Dissemination of uniform legal practices 
Institutional control of market economies 
 
Figure 1 – Examples from list of 81 factors identified through STEEP-derived 
analysis. 
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Figure 2 – Examples of clustering of factors beyond PEST listings in Figure 1. 
  
Availability of wireless technologies 
at reasonable cost 
Falling costs of IT hardware and 
infrastructure 
Licensing of software 
Learning and reuse of knowledge within 
the SSA context 
Educated classes stay or migrate 
ICT infrastructure 
Changing access to 
secondary/tertiary education 
provision 
Managed access to 
intellectual property 
Mindset for success or 
failure 
Education leads to 
employment 
opportunity growth 
Access to Skills and Knowledge 
Population migration 
Age profile of African populace 
skewed towards younger people 
Cultural differences between African 
peoples 
Involvement and influence 
of religions organisations 
Refugee status 
Demographic Pressures 
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Figure 3 – Impact/predictability matrix and the „scenario structuring space‟ 
  
High impact Low impact 
Low predictability 
The scenario approach - (un)certainty 
High predictability 
Scenario structuring 
space 
Demographic 
pressures 
Impact of 
endemic 
disease 
Dealing with 
crime as 
endemic 
Management of 
ecology and 
environment 
Inter-regional 
economic 
relationships 
Global factors 
outside SSA 
Local & 
regional 
governance 
Access to skills 
and knowledge 
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Plausible outcome  Possible scenario 
dimension 
Plausible outcome 
Outcome A1: 
Wasteful/corrupt 
Dependent 
Politically unstable 
Procrastination 
 
Dimension A: 
Local and regional 
governance 
 
Outcome A2: 
Peaceful collaboration 
Effective governance 
Political stability 
Corruption controlled 
Outcome B1: 
Willingness to help 
External prosperity and 
peace 
Debt relief 
Fair trade conditions 
Dimension B: 
Impact of global factors 
outside SSA 
 
Outcome B2: 
Lack of interest 
Protectionism 
Global unrest 
Economic slowdown 
 
Figure 4 – Plausible outcomes from two identified scenario dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Scenario Extracts* 
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Summary of Scenario A1B2 entitled “ Open Wound” 
 
This scenario shows that over the course of the 10 year period under consideration, 
the health and education environment has gone form an already poor situation to an 
almost total breakdown in the majority of countries in the region. The infection rate of 
AIDS/HIV in the general population has reached 35%, and is exceeding 40% in the 
worst hit areas. The rate of infection, combined with an increasing „brain drain‟ has 
led to acute shortages of education and healthcare professionals. Conflicts which 
were thought to be close to resolution in 2003 have flared up with renewed vigour, 
and others have erupted, affecting virtually every country in the region, leading to 
widespread breakdowns in the education system, and overwhelming what medical 
facilities still exist. 
 
The move towards the establishment of multi-party democracies across the region in 
the 1990s has faltered and regressed with increasing levels of conflict and 
corruption. There is very limited foreign investment, and what does exist is 
exploitative, with none of the revenue remaining in SSA. Recession in the global 
economic environment has let to large drops in aid funding, and debt has spiralled. 
Trade with an increasingly isolationist and protectionist United States has fallen to an 
all time low, and looks set to fall further. 
 
At the end of the ten year period, there has been fragmentation of virtually all of the 
multi-national African organisations, and an explosion in conflict. It is difficult to 
envisage anything other than a further degradation of health and education. 
AIDS/HIV infection rates have hit all time highs, endemic diseases such as malaria 
have re-surged, and the number of children in education has fallen to an all time low. 
The region as a whole looks to be entering a period driven by conflict and 
lawlessness. Most of the major aid agencies have withdrawn after several instances 
of workers being murdered. 
 
This summary was followed by a full 2000-word exposition of the scenario storyline, 
with events, causal relationships, and reference to specific countries, people, etc. 
 
It should be noted that the full version of this, largely, pessimistic scenario starts with 
optimistic moves: 
- “the introduction of French peace keeping forces in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, along with moves towards the establishment of the transnational 
government headed by Joseph Kabila seemed to provide some hope…..”  
However, it moves on to discuss “…the first clashes between French 
peacekeeping forces and local militias in mid June… was a portent of things 
to come.” Later, “Most of the major aid agencies had long since withdrawn 
personnel from the region following on from the killings of several International 
Red Cross workers in May 2007.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: continued 
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Summary of Scenario A2B2 entitled “Self Help” 
 
In this scenario, the future is where the region has enjoyed stable governance, 
despite external global influences not being helpful. The scenario gets its title 
because it offered SSA hope of steady progress, albeit on its own terms; in a way, 
relatively independent of the rest of the world. A recurring theme in this scenario is 
the empowering of the population, and this will have had to happen via several 
interrelated threads, whereby society develops in a peaceful, self-sustaining way. 
 
Extracts from main storyline: 
“Even though SSA is enormous, two key events went a long way to generating a 
spirit of optimism that allowed real progress to be made across the region over the 
decade. The first was the resolution of the political unrest in Zimbabwe at the end of 
2003, and the bedding in of a new government over the following year. The 
second… was the cessation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo… at 
a time when the UN appeared completely powerless, and bogged down with bitter 
recriminations between the members of its Security Council over the reconstruction 
of post-war Iraq.” 
“…while the African Union was quietly getting on with the business of getting its own 
house in order, and re-establishing the rule of law… the developed world was 
increasingly preoccupied with its fear of international terrorism, the single issue 
which dominated the run-up to the US Presidential elections of 2008.” 
“…particular emphasis was place right away on spending to educate the population 
in birth control and sexual health. Healthy diets and healthy sexual practices were 
also effectively and vigorously promoted.” 
“Despite the positive, sustainable outcomes that have been outlined so far, it is worth 
considering how the development could be regarded as quite fragile. Essentially, it 
has been dependent on the global community having acted in a benign or neutral 
way to SSA, and it is worth spending some time thinking about what might have 
happened should there have been global instability and/or continuing global 
economic decline.” 
 
It should be noted that this scenario provides an interesting mix of internal drivers 
within SSA , coupled with a dis-interested world beyond. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Extracts from scenarios constructed by Strathclyde MBA students: Janyn Tan, 
Moira Kennedy, Jim Brown, Derek Henderson, David Bain and Neil Watson. 
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